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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




 ROBERT C. WARNOCK,
                 Appellant
       v.
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; ARIZONA CARDINALS, INC. d/b/a ARIZONA
CARDINALS; ATLANTA FALCONS FOOTBALL CLUB LLC d/b/a ATLANTA FALCONS;
BALTIMORE RAVENS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP d/b/a BALTIMORE RAVENS; BUFFALO
BILLS, INC d/b/a BUFFALO BILLS; CHICAGO BEARS FOOTBALL CLUB INC.
d/b/a CHICAGO BEARS; PITTSBURGH STEELERS INC. d/b/a PITTSBURGH
STEELERS LLC; CLEVELAND BROWNS LLC d/b/a CLEVELAND BROWNS; DALLAS
COWBOYS FOOTBALL CLUB LTD d/b/a DALLAS COWBOYS; DENVER BRONCOS
FOOTBALL CLUB d/b/a DENVER BRONCOS; DETROIT LIONS INC. d/b/a DETROIT
LIONS; GREEN BAY PACKERS INC. d/b/a GREEN BAY PACKERS; HOUSTON NFL
HOLDINGS LP d/b/a HOUSTON TEXANS; INDIANAPOLIS COLTS; JACKSONVILLE
JAGUARS LTD. d/b/a JACKSONVILLE JAGUARS; KANSAS CITY CHIEFS
FOOTBALL CLUB INC. d/b/a KANSAS CITY CHIEFS; MIAMI DOLPHINS; MINNESOTA
VIKINGS FOOTBALL CLUB LLC d/b/a MINNESOTA VIKINGS; NEW ENGLAND
PATRIOTS;
NEW ORLEANS SAINTS LP d/b/a NEW ORLEANS SAINTS; NEW YORK FOOTBALL
GIANTS d/b/a NEW YORK GIANTS; NEW YORK JETS FOOTBALL CLUB INC. d/b/a
NEW YORK JETS; OAKLAND RAIDERS LP d/b/a OAKLAND RAIDERS; PANTHERS
FOOTBALL LLC d/b/a CAROLINA PANTHERS; PHILADELPHIA EAGLES; PITTSBURGH
STEELERS SPORTS, INC. d/b/a PITTSBURGH STEELERS; SAN DIEGO CHARGERS
FOOTBALL CO. d/b/a SAN DIEGO CHARGERS; SAN FRANCISCO 49ERS LTD. d/b/a
SAN FRANCISCO 49ERS; SEATTLE SEAHAWKS INC. d/b/a SEATTLE SEAHAWKS; ST
LOUIS RAMS FOOTBALL CO. d/b/a ST LOUIS RAMS; TAMPA BAY BUCCANEERS;
TENNESSEE TITANS LLP d/b/a TENNESSEE TITANS; WASHINGTON FOOTBALL INC.
d/b/a WASHINGTON REDSKINS
2____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 04-cv-00330)
District Judge: Honorable Joy F. Conti 
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 21, 2005
Before: SMITH, BECKER and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges





Robert C. Warnock is a municipal taxpayer, residing in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
He alleges in his complaint that the defendants, the National Football League (“NFL”)
and all of its member football clubs, including the Pittsburgh Steelers, violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1-2, and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15, by
acting in concert to force host cities and counties to build new football stadiums and then
lease those stadiums to the clubs under favorable lease terms.  Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing.  The District Court held that Warnock was
essentially bringing derivative claims on behalf of Allegheny County and the Sports and
3Exhibition Authority of the City of Pittsburgh and that his allegations, taken as true for
purposes of the motion to dismiss, did not give rise to standing.  The Court concluded that
Warnock’s injury was not fairly traceable to the conduct of defendants.  His injury was
that his tax dollars were allegedly being improperly spent on a disputed practice and yet
the league and its clubs were not the entity that allegedly improperly distributed the tax
dollars.  Moreover, the NFL and its clubs did not have the ability to levy and collect taxes
from the citizens of Allegheny County.  The lawsuit thus failed for lack of constitutional
standing.  Additionally, the Court held that the suit also failed under the prudential
limitations of the municipal taxpayer doctrine. Warnock’s claim clearly did not meet the
first requirement as no government entity had been sued.  As to the second requirement,
Warnock was suing for more than equitable relief.
We agree and affirm, essentially for the reasons set forth in Judge Conti’s excellent
opinion.  We also note, in apparent agreement with Judge Conti, see 356 F. Supp.2d 535,
545 n.7(W.D.Pa. 2005), that even if Allegheny County was a party to the lawsuit, plaintiff
could not meet the more demanding requirements of antitrust standing.
In assessing this issue, we use the framework established in Associated General
Contractors of California v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983),
to consider several factors in an antitrust standing analysis:
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and the harm to the
plaintiff and the intent by the defendant to cause that harm, with neither
factor alone conferring standing; 
4(2) whether the plaintiff's alleged injury is of the type for which the antitrust
laws were intended to provide redress; 
(3) the directness of the injury, which addressed the concerns that liberal
application of standing principles might produce speculative claims; 
(4) the existence of more direct victims of the alleged antitrust violations; and 
(5) the potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of
damages.
2660 Woodley Rd. Joint Venture v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 369 F.3d 732, 740-41 (3d Cir.
2004).
As we see it, the pivotal question here is the “directness” of the victim – as
opposed to the injury. We must ask whether there are “more direct victims” of the NFL’s
alleged violations. Id. at 741. It appears to us that Allegheny County and the Sports &
Exhibition Authority have been more directly harmed than taxpayers like Warnock. They
have allegedly been coerced to offer favorable terms to the Steelers, to the taxpayers’
detriment. Therefore, taxpayers would be only indirect victims. Granted, Warnock alleges
that the County and the Authority are engaged in an “unholy alliance” with the NFL.
However, if that is the case, the County and the Authority would be the proper
defendants, not the NFL.  Indeed, the District Court properly cited Areeda & Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law § 335a (2d ed. 2000), for the proposition that allegations of political
influence or conspiracy on the part of the government are not sufficient for standing. 356
F. Supp. at 545 n.7.
Also, one of the essential tenets of antitrust standing is that a plaintiff must
5generally be a “competitor or customer” of the defendant. This requirement can be
fulfilled if the harm to the plaintiff is “inextricably intertwined” with the antitrust
conspiracy. See Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d
425, 429 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, Warnock is clearly not a competitor. Nor is he a customer
in the traditional sense. He has not alleged that he is either a prospective professional
football team owner, or that he is an actual consumer of the NFL’s products. Unless one
concludes that Warnock’s harm is “inextricably intertwined” with the alleged violation,
which it is not, Warnock is simply a taxpayer with a general grievance. 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
